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a b s t r a c t 
Are agglomeration and peer effects at stake in academic research? To tackle this question, we study how 
departments’ characteristics affect the quantity and quality of academics’ publications in economics in 
France, controlling for individual time-varying characteristics and individual ﬁxed effects. Department 
characteristics have an explanatory power at least equal to a quarter of that of individual characteristics 
and possibly as high as theirs. The quantity and quality of an academic’s publications in a ﬁeld increase 
with the presence of other academics specialised in that ﬁeld and with the share of the department’s 
publications output in that ﬁeld. In contrast, department size, proximity to other large departments, ho- 
mogeneity in terms of publication performance, presence of colleagues with connections abroad, and 
composition in terms of positions and age matter for some publication measures but only if not control- 
ling for individual ﬁxed effects. 
© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
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0. Introduction 
Every academic has an opinion about what makes a good de-
artment. However, there are surprisingly few econometric stud-
es that quantify this precisely, despite possible implications for
he design of education and research institutions, an always-topical∗ Corresponding author. 
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094-1190/© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. oncern (see for instance Aghion et al., 2010 ). Indeed, a large lit-
rature documents both the gains from spatial concentration (see
osenthal and Strange, 2004; Combes and Gobillon, 2015 ) and the
ffects of local peers and networks (see Sacerdote, 2011; Jackson,
011 ), which all could be at stake in academic departments. Here,
e focus on the role on individual publication records in eco-
omics in France of both individual characteristics and a large set
f departments’ characteristics. We develop a careful strategy that
ontrols for possible spatial selection of academics and missing
ariables. 
Both the urban economics and the local peer effects literatures
ave emphasised the importance and diﬃculty of disentangling the
ole of individual sorting from the causal impact of the local envi-
onment. What makes individuals productive? Is it their own abil-
ties, or the location (ﬁrm, city, school, etc.) where they operate?
n the context of universities, do academics publish more because
f their higher ability (based on gender, age or some other pos-
ibly unobserved characteristics) and a publication strategy that
rings higher rewards (e.g. research ﬁeld, number and location of
o-authors)? Or because they are located in departments that pro-
ide better local environments and stronger externalities, which
28 C. Bosquet, P.-P. Combes / Journal of Urban Economics 101 (2017) 27–44 
Fig. 1. Distribution of the (detrended logarithm of) individual publication quality in departments above and below median total number of publications. 
Notes: Panel (a): Net of time and ﬁeld ﬁxed effects only. Panel (b): Net of time and ﬁeld ﬁxed effects and observed individual characteristics (gender, age and age squared, 
position, number of authors per publication, overall ﬁeld diversity, co-authors located abroad). Publication measures and individual characteristics are deﬁned in Section 2 . 
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e  include both standard agglomeration economies due to speciali-
sation, size and proximity to other departments, and the compo-
sition of local peers and their connections to foreign co-authors?
Using an exhaustive panel of French academics in economics, over
19 years (1990–2008), including their quality-adjusted publication
records in EconLit 4 and the location of the French economics de-
partments employing them, we ﬁnd that both individual skills and
location matter for publications. 
One the one hand, this contrasts with a few recent papers
that consider a subset of the effects identiﬁed here. For in-
stance, Waldinger (2012) concludes for Germany that there were
no localised peer effects among physicists, mathematicians and
chemists under the Nazi regime. Somewhat similarly, Kim et al.
(2009) conclude that aﬃliation to one of the top 25 US universi-
ties in the 1990s, unlike in the 1970s and 1980s, no longer had an
effect on individual academic outcomes in economics and ﬁnance.
This is conﬁrmed for mathematics all over the world by Dubois
et al. (2014) , who show that the best departments do not neces-
sarily generate positive externalities even if they are the most suc-
cessful at hiring the most promising academics. Oyer (2006) shows
that top placements for new PhD graduate economists have long-
term beneﬁts for their careers, but no beneﬁts related to enhanced
productivity (in the 1990s). Our somewhat discordant conclusion
might be explained by either the different context under study,
which would mean that European institutions currently generate
more local externalities than modern-day US universities, or Ger-
man universities under the Nazi regime, or by the fact that our
data set allows us to consider more local effects and to develop a
more complete econometric strategy. 
On the other hand, our ﬁnding clearly matches the agglomera-
tion effects literature, which concludes that gains from spatial con-
centration exist in market activities even if individual characteris-
tics and spatial sorting explain much of productivity differentials.
This is illustrated for instance by Combes et al. (2008a ) who use
a reduced form approach similar to the one considered here or by
Baum-Snow and Pavan (2012) in a structural approach. The con-
clusion is also in line with the local peer effect literature, which
emphasises a signiﬁcant (although not always large) role of peers
and networks, either on labour markets (see recent examples by4 EconLit is the electronic bibliography of the American Economic Association 
(see http://www.aeaweb.org/econlit/index.php ). It is one of the largest publication 
data sets, listing more than 560,0 0 0 articles published between 1969 and 2008 in 
more than 1200 journals. 
r  
s  
(  
i  amm, 2014; Hellerstein et al., 2014 ), at school (e.g. Lefgren, 2004;
ang, 2007; Lavy et al., 2012 ) or in criminal activities (e.g. Zenou,
0 03; Bayer et al., 20 09 ). This is also consistent with the role
f proximity found for innovative activities. Indeed, studying aca-
emic publications also bears the advantage, compared to general
abour market outcomes for instance, to better isolate a speciﬁc
gglomeration mechanism, innovation and knowledge spillovers,
hich the literature usually does by using data on patents and in-
ovation, as surveyed by Carlino and Kerr (2015) . 
Fig. 1 , inspired by Combes et al. (2012) , shows both the higher
uality of the publications of academics located in departments
hat produce a larger number of publications, and the fact that
ndividual observed characteristics explain only part of this differ-
nce. In panel (a) in Fig. 1 , the distribution of (the detrended loga-
ithm of) individual average publication quality in a given ﬁeld (for
recise deﬁnitions see Section 2 ) is plotted for two groups of aca-
emics from departments above and below the median for total
umber of publications. Clearly, the former distribution is shifted
nd dilated, to the right of the latter. Academics in departments
ith more publications have higher average publications quality.
his can be seen at any point in the distribution (the shift) and
s especially obvious for higher quality (the dilation). Interestingly,
n panel (b), which uses the same department grouping, the con-
lusion still emerges when individual average publication quality
s netted out of the role of some individual observed characteris-
ics. However, it holds to a lesser extent due to the positive sorting
f academics with better characteristics into better departments.
ore generally, we show that, when not controlling for individual
xed effects, location explains as much as do observed individual
haracteristics. When controlling for individual ﬁxed effects, loca-
ion still represents at least a quarter of the explanatory power of
ll individual characteristics. 
Beyond the respective roles of individual and local effects, it is
rucial for the optimal policy design to shed some light on the
echanisms underlying local effects. This goal is shared for in-
tance by Hellerstein et al. (2014) who try to assess whether neigh-
ourhood effects on labour markets are stronger between or within
roups, in terms of race or ethnicity, by Lavy et al. (2012) who
valuate the impact of the presence of low-ability peers in class-
ooms on teachers’ pedagogical practice and the quality of inter-
tudent and student-teacher relationships, or by Agrawal et al.
2008) who study the relative role of spatial and social proxim-
ty for knowledge ﬂows. In urban economics, the initial focus on
C. Bosquet, P.-P. Combes / Journal of Urban Economics 101 (2017) 27–44 29 
Fig. 2. Distribution of the (detrended logarithm of) individual publication quality in departments above and below median ﬁeld presence. 
Notes: Panel (a): Net of time and ﬁeld ﬁxed effects only. Panel (b): Net of time and ﬁeld ﬁxed effects and observed individual characteristics (gender, age and its square, 
position, number of authors per publication, overall ﬁeld diversity, co-authors located abroad). Publication measures and individual characteristics are deﬁned in Section 2 . 
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t  ity size and specialisation has been extended to a large num-
er of city characteristics (see Combes and Gobillon, 2015 ). We try
o open the black box of department effects and assess the rel-
tive magnitude of the channels through which these effects op-
rate. However, standard urban economics variables usually corre-
ated with the strength of local externalities have little explanatory
ower when controlling for individual ﬁxed effects. This holds for
oth the variables capturing within-ﬁeld externalities (‘localisation
conomies’) and overall department observed characteristics (‘ur-
anisation economies’). This also holds for the local composition
f peers and the network effects that we consider. 
However, some department variables exert a signiﬁcant impact
nd, especially, those related to localisation economies. Being spe-
ialised in a ﬁeld signiﬁcantly and largely increases the quantity
nd quality of the publications in this ﬁeld even when control-
ing for individual ﬁxed effects. This is illustrated by Fig. 2 , which
lots the distribution of individual average publication quality in a
iven ﬁeld as in Fig. 1 , but now for departments with ﬁeld pres-
nce (presence of other academics publishing in the same ﬁeld)
bove (respectively below) the median. The right shift and dilation
re present even when individual characteristics are controlled for
n panel (b). More generally, we show that the mere presence in
he department of other academics publishing in the ﬁeld gener-
tes large positive externalities, even when controlling for individ-
al ﬁxed effects. This increases the average quantity and quality
f other academics’ publications in this ﬁeld by 40%. This effect is
einforced if the department’s ﬁeld share increases. For instance,
he number of an academic’s publications in a ﬁeld increases by
% if other academics’ share of publications in that ﬁeld doubles.
n contrast, department size, proximity to other large departments,
omogeneity in terms of publication performance, presence of col-
eagues with connections abroad, and composition in terms of po-
itions and age matter for some publication measures but only if
ot controlling for individual ﬁxed effects. 
We also study the role of a number of time-varying individual
haracteristics. Controlling for department characteristics, publish-
ng with a high number of co-authors per paper reduces the num-
er of publications per individual but is positively correlated with
igher publication quality, which suggests the presence of increas-
ng returns to scale at the co-author team level. Having two co-
uthors rather than one for instance increases the average quality
y between 8% and 25%. The average quality of an academic’s pub-
ications increases also with the number of his/her publications,uggesting the presence of increasing returns to scale also at the
ndividual level. Consistently with the literature on network effects,
e also ﬁnd that being connected to foreign co-authors increases
oth the quantity and quality of publications. 
Concern over possibly endogenous location choices and spa-
ial sorting of talents that might inﬂuence the measurement of
epartment effects are taken seriously. We cannot use a natural
xperiment to remove endogenous selection to departments, as
n Waldinger (2012) who uses the dismissal of scientists in Nazi
ermany, or Azoulay et al. (2010) who employs premature death
mong superstar academics. The inﬂow of Soviet mathematicians
o the US after 1992 is employed in Borjas and Doran (2012) ,
ho show that Soviet mathematicians substituted mainly for lo-
al mathematicians, whose publications fell sharply while overall
ublications slightly increased. However, they do not consider the
ffect of location within the US, and of departments’ characteris-
ics. Natural experiments are also widely used in the peer effect
iterature, as for instance in Kang (2007) and Damm (2014) who
se quasi-random assignments of peers to individual students in
iddle schools of South Korea and of refugee immigrants to Dan-
sh municipalities. 
Still, availability of an individual panel allows us to esti-
ate speciﬁcations that consider both individual and department
ariables and both individual and department-time ﬁxed effects.
herefore, local effects are net of possible academic spatial sort-
ng, whether based on time-varying observed or time-constant un-
bserved individual effects, which corresponds to a fairly general
etting. The French context we use helps also to reduce selection
oncerns. While initial aﬃliation, which is captured by the indi-
idual ﬁxed effect, certainly is related to individual characteristics
n France, most subsequent moves clearly are driven not by pub-
ication performance, but rather by friendship connections or per-
onal/family reasons. This is due to the features of the French aca-
emic system. For instance, moving does not affect salary since
cademics are civil servants, who receive the same remuneration
n any department even if there might be non-monetary beneﬁts
f being in a better department, as higher social status, access to
etter students, more interesting colleagues, etc. In addition, the
ost frequent transition from assistant professor to full professor,
he largest source of movements in France, involves success in the
Agrégation’ contest, following which spatial allocation is largely
andom for most candidates (see Bosquet et al., 2014 , for more de-
ails). Thus, although our experiment is not completely random, we
30 C. Bosquet, P.-P. Combes / Journal of Urban Economics 101 (2017) 27–44 
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e  do not think that individual time-varying publication shocks condi-
tional on individual and department-time ﬁxed effects are affect-
ing location choices and biasing our evaluation of local effects to
any great extent. Also, not using a natural experiment has the ad-
vantage that the results obtained are more general and, thus, have
greater external validity. For instance, the characteristics of the co-
authors of superstars, or the scientists dismissed by the Nazis, may
differ from the characteristics of the average current academic. 5 
In addition to the endogeneity of individual location choices, re-
verse causality biases can also affect the role of department char-
acteristics. For instance, Combes et al. (2010) show that the impact
of city size in market activities decreases by up to 20% when lo-
cal variables are instrumented. Given the large number of depart-
ment characteristics we consider here, it would be diﬃcult (and
would not make much sense) to instrument all of them and, in ad-
dition, would introduce possible weak instrument issues. We are
not aware of other studies of agglomeration and peer effects in
academia that propose instrumentation of department character-
istics. We leave this issue to future contributions. 
As Combes and Gobillon (2015) detail, simultaneous identiﬁca-
tion of individual and location-time ﬁxed effects is demanding and
requires suﬃcient mobility of individuals between locations. Ex-
act identiﬁcation conditions are diﬃcult to check empirically and,
in the literature, this is never attempted in practice. The mobil-
ity of French academic economists across departments is not very
high and the sample size is much lower than that of standard
employer-employee data sets. Conversely, the aﬃliation of some
academics to more than one department at the same time in-
creases identiﬁcation power. Also, information on age, gender, po-
sition, publication ﬁelds and author connections, may make it less
important to control for individual ﬁxed effects at the cost of con-
sidering possibly endogenous individual control variables. Overall,
it is diﬃcult to assess whether individual and local effects are
well identiﬁed here. We present the two sets of estimations, with
and without individual ﬁxed effects, and comment if the conclu-
sions differ between the two. A slight positive sorting of academics
with the best observed characteristics into departments that gen-
erate higher positive externalities is observed if individual ﬁxed ef-
fects are not considered. When considering individual ﬁxed effects,
sorting on unobservables is slightly negative, which, in the litera-
ture, is considered a possible sign of lack of identiﬁcation power
(see Abowd et al., 2004; Andrews et al., 2012 ). Therefore, it is
not possible to be sure that the model with both individual and
department-time ﬁxed effects is correctly identiﬁed. This concern
becomes more evident when we observe that removing 15% of the
academics located in the largest departments (alternatively those
among the 15% most publishing academics), who, thus, contribute
the most to identiﬁcation, reinforces the presence of negative sort-
ing. Conversely, our conclusions about the relative importance of
individual and department effects for publication, and the positive
role of department’s specialisation, are robust to these checks. 
Finally, we decompose individual productivity into three com-
ponents: the probability to publish in a given period, the number
of publications, and the average quality of those publications. We
study the determinants of these three dimensions separately, at
the detailed sub-ﬁeld level within economics. Most previous works5 Another strategy would ﬁrst specify a model for the academic’s department 
choice and then estimate our empirical model conditional on that choice. However, 
this requires exclusion restrictions to be satisﬁed, i.e. variables that explain depart- 
ment choice, but not publication record. We cannot envisage suitable variables since 
even family characteristics might explain publication record. Alternatively, some 
authors, such as Gould (2007) , Baum-Snow and Pavan (2012) or Beaudry et al. 
(2014) for instance, have proposed structural estimations where the full set of local 
opportunities is speciﬁed for any individual, and optimal inter-temporal location 
choices are made. We chose not to follow this suggestion which imposes a great 
deal of structure on the estimation. 
d  
C  
F  
r  
w  
t
Sonsider broader ﬁelds with only the quality adjusted number of
ublications as the dependent variable, which could blur the re-
pective effects of publication quantity and quality. We show that
he effect of some variables differs from one productivity dimen-
ion to another, which means that the optimal strategy for an in-
ividual or a department depends on the dimension targeted. In
ddition, we perform our estimations on two different, more or
ess selective indexes of publication quality. Typically, the (individ-
al and department) determinants of publication in top journals
ight differ from the determinants of publication in ﬁeld journals.
ur use of a quality index for all 1200 EconLit journals enables us
o study such differences, whereas most of the studies in the liter-
ture focus on a small number of journals: 23 in Waldinger (2012) ,
1 in Kim et al. (2009) , 98 in Dubois et al. (2014) . 
Our data set of all academics in economics located in France is
oth exhaustive and provides the other important advantage that
t includes non-publishing academics. Studies based only on biblio-
etric sources necessarily exclude this group. This means that de-
artment characteristics, computed only on publishers, can be af-
ected by potentially large measurement error since non-publishing
cademics can account for 30% of a department’s membership (see
ombes and Linnemer, 2003 , for both European and US depart-
ents). That is, department size is based not on the actual number
f academics used here, but the number of academics in the de-
artment who published over the period analysed (which is usu-
lly a short time period). Last, we have information on more indi-
idual characteristics, such as age, gender and academic position,
hich might affect publication output and, usually, are not con-
idered by the data sets used in other studies. All of these aspects
ould inﬂuence the results obtained and may explain our new ﬁnd-
ngs, although we acknowledge that these are estimated only on
rench economics departments. 
Section 2 presents the data and econometric strategy. The re-
ults for the relative roles of individual characteristics and depart-
ent effects for individual output are presented in Sections 3 and
 , and the results for channels of department effects are presented
n Section 5 . Section 6 concludes. 
. Data and estimation strategy 
.1. Academics, departments, publications 
The French Ministry of Higher Education and Research, CNRS
nd INRA 6 provided us with lists of academics in economics in
rance during the period 1990 to 2008. Each academic is aﬃliated
o at least one university department or to a CNRS or INRA re-
earch centre. In this study, ‘department’ refers either to the only
ﬃliation of the economist in a university (the majority of cases)
r the aggregation of all the university departments or research
entres that include economists. We believe that this aggregation
etter matches the French reality of academic research compared
o using detailed aﬃliations. 
The French system allows for multiple aﬃliations and 9% of aca-
emics are aﬃliated to two or three departments. In those cases,
ach department is weighted equally. For the few cases of aca-
emics with positions in both France and abroad, we use their
Vs to evaluate the share attributable to the French department.
inally, we want the analysis to focus only on academics who can
eally be considered as forming a local group of academics who
ork together. Therefore, we retained only those departments with6 Respectively, Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche - Direc- 
ion Générale de la Recherche et de l’Innovation, Centre National de la Recherche 
cientiﬁque, and Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique. 
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9 Introducing ﬁeld-time ﬁxed effects responds to an interpretation issue. If it is 
assumed that differences in publication records between ﬁelds at the France level 
in a given year are a matter of “fashion” rather than talent and a real difference in 
productivity among academics and departments specialised in different ﬁelds, then 
the differences at the France level should be removed by the introduction of ﬁeld- 
time ﬁxed effects, allowing a focus on spatial variability independent of specialisa- t least four full-time equivalent academics and excluding isolated
conomists in universities with no formal economics department. 7 
The data set includes a number of individual characteristics
uch as gender, age and position. We merge this with EconLit by
ast name and ﬁrst initial of the ﬁrst name because the recording
f full ﬁrst names in EconLit is not suﬃciently systematic. Using
he ﬁrst initial increases the number of academics with identical
ames but very slightly. Their publication records were dealt with
anually. For all academics and for each year between 1990 and
008, we have data on academics’ individual characteristics, de-
artments of aﬃliation and publication record, in economic jour-
als only, which excludes even top journals such as Nature and
cience . 
We measure the publications output of academics in ﬁeld f at
ate t as the weighted sum of their publications in ﬁeld f listed in
conLit over the period τ . In most cases, τ corresponds to years
 + 1 , t + 2 , t + 3 and output at date t is a moving average over
hese three years. This choice is in line with the literature and was
dopted recently by Ductor et al. (2014) . It seems to be a reason-
ble estimation of the time needed to write a paper and the pub-
ication delays. 8 
Each publication is weighted ﬁrst by the quality of the journal
n which it is published. We use two of the Combes and Linnemer
2010) journal weighting schemes, a very selective one, which we
escribe as ‘Top quality’, and a less selective one, which we call
Quality’. Second, in line with common practice in the literature,
ach publication is weighted also by the inverse of its number of
uthors. Third, the output measure takes account also of the ar-
icle’s relative number of pages (within a journal). Last, output is
easured at ﬁeld level by attributing 1/ J of the corresponding pub-
ication output to each of the J Jel codes (aggregated in 18 different
ategories) mentioned in the publication. 
Finally, instead of studying only the determinants of the num-
er of an academic’s quality-adjusted publications, we decompose
his into three variables whose determinants are studied succes-
ively. These are: the probability to publish in a given ﬁeld over
he period, the number of publications in the ﬁeld over the period,
nd the average quality (or top quality) of the publications over
he period. Appendix A provides more details on these measures. 
.2. Econometric speciﬁcations 
To separate agglomeration effects from the role played by in-
ividual characteristics, we follow the econometric strategy pro-
osed in Combes et al. (2008a ), whose advantages are discussed
n Combes and Gobillon (2015) . This strategy comprises a two-step
rocedure. In the ﬁrst step, the logarithm of academic i output in
eld f at date t, y ift is regressed on individual characteristics that
ary or not over time (and possibly an individual ﬁxed effect), a
epartment-time ﬁxed effect ( βdt ) and the department character-
stics that depend on the ﬁeld: 
og y ift = θi + Individual’s Characteristics it ϕ 
+ Department’s Field-Speciﬁc Characteristics dft η
+ βdt + μft + ε ift , (1) 
here θ i and μft are individual and ﬁeld-time ﬁxed effects, respec-
ively, and εift is an individual random productivity component as-7 We conducted robustness checks using detailed aﬃliations (i.e. not aggregated 
ﬃliations within each university) and on departments with more than 9 full-time 
quivalent academics. The results are fully consistent with present ones, as pre- 
ented in Bosquet and Combes (2017) . 
8 As a robustness check and because this choice is both somewhat arbitrary and 
ould result in some autocorrelation of residuals, in Bosquet and Combes (2017) we 
resent the regressions with τ reduced to year t + 2 . The results are very similar to 
hose obtained using a three-year moving average. 
t
a
t
s
e
c
s
e
p
tumed to be independent and identically distributed (iid) across
ndividuals, ﬁelds and periods. 9 
The ﬁrst step allows us to evaluate the respective explanatory
ower of individual characteristics, department ﬁeld-speciﬁc char-
cteristics, and department-time ﬁxed effects. These last ones cap-
ure not only the department’s observed overall characteristics but
lso any unobserved local effect. The second-step estimation allows
s to identify the separate roles of each department’s overall char-
cteristic on the estimated department-time ﬁxed effect, net of in-
ividual effects, ˆ βdt : 
ˆ 
dt = Department’s Overall Characteristics dt γ
+ δt + υdt , (2) 
here δt is a time ﬁxed effect and υdt is a random department
evel component, which is assumed to be iid across departments
nd periods. Since the dependent variable in the second-step is
ffected by measurement error due to its estimation in the ﬁrst
tep, we use Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) in the sec-
nd step. We assume that the speciﬁcations (1) and (2) hold for
ach component of the individual’s publication record: the proba-
ility to publish, the number of publications and the publication’s
verage quality (or top quality). 
Finally, the ﬁrst-step estimations need to weight the individ-
al observations for two reasons. First, an academic can belong
o more than one department. For each academic, date and ﬁeld,
e have as many observations as the academic’s number of aﬃl-
ations, and each has a weight αidt , which is the share attributed
o each aﬃliation. Second, since each publication is split between
ts Jel codes, academics may publish in many ﬁelds each year. To
ake account of both of these effects, the ﬁrst-step estimations are
eighted by αidt for the probability to publish, and by αidt S ift for
he publication quantity and quality, where S ift is the share of ﬁeld
 in academic i ’s output at date t . This means that in all the re-
ressions each academic receives the same weight. Ordinary Least
quares (OLS) estimations are employed for the probability to pub-
ish due to the presence of many ﬁxed effects. We checked that a
robit estimation leads to similar results. 
.3. Department characteristics 
‘Department’s Overall Characteristics’ include a ﬁrst set of vari-
bles for the department’s demographic structure: the logarithm
f department size, measured by its number of full-time equiv-
lent academics (referred to in the tables as ‘Size ’), the share of
omen in the department (‘ % women ’), the average age of the aca-
emics (‘ Average a ge’), the share of upper positions (full professor
ather than assistant professor, for instance, described as ‘ % rank
 ’), and the share of a number of speciﬁc academic positions (‘ Po-
itions ’ shares’). 
Department size corresponds to the variable for total employ-
ent density in standard estimations of agglomeration economies.ion choices. Conversely, if it is assumed that a higher number of publications in 
 ﬁeld at the France level in a given year genuinely corresponds to higher produc- 
ivity in that ﬁeld, then ﬁeld-time ﬁxed effects should not be introduced into the 
peciﬁcation. Here, we adopt the former assumption and introduce ﬁeld-time ﬁxed 
ffects. This is the more conservative strategy since it removes the role of possible 
orrelation between local effects and ﬁeld specialisation choices. It is also the as- 
umption adopted in urban economics, which considers systematic industry ﬁxed 
ffects in wage or productivity equations. It estimates local effects once direct com- 
osition effects are removed. Importantly, this does not prevent us from identifying 
he local externality role of the department’s ﬁeld-speciﬁc characteristics. 
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o  It reﬂects possible local externalities emerging from the overall
size of the local economy. The list of possible positive effects
from department size is long, but includes, for example, the fact
that academics in larger departments may beneﬁt from larger and
more intense scientiﬁc interactions with their peers, from a larger
(more numerous) administrative and/or research assistance staff, or
shared computing facilities, from greater bargaining power within
the university or greater likelihood at the national level to receive
more research funds, or from greater overall visibility which rein-
forces external network effects. We cannot exclude the possibility
of congestion effects causing size also to generate some negative
effects. In line with most of this literature, only the total net ef-
fect of size is identiﬁed, which is the case for most of the local
variables in these settings. 
For a given department size, departments may have younger
or older academics, more or less women, or a higher ratio of full
professors to assistant professors, for instance. As Hellerstein et al.
(1999) suggest, these composition effects are introduced into the
speciﬁcation as their proportions in the department’s total num-
ber of academics. This allows us to assess whether different types
of academics generate stronger local externalities. 10 For instance,
older academics may contribute their experience, women may gen-
erate more externalities than men, and similarly for the different
types of positions. A strand of work in the industrial organisation
literature (see, for instance, Besley and Ghatak, 2008; Auriol et al.,
2012 ) studies the role of status incentives and the implications for
the optimal shares of the different positions within ﬁrms, which
is another interpretation of these variables. The French academic
system is rather complex in terms of possible academic status. We
distinguish ﬁrst between lower and upper (Rank A) positions (as-
sistant professor versus full professor). Also, some academics have
teaching obligations while others do not, some are attached to the
local university while others depend on national research institutes
(CNRS, INRA, EHESS, etc.), and a few are linked to domains other
than economics (business, mathematics, etc.). Each type of posi-
tion can generate more or fewer externalities since both the time
devoted to research and the incentives to cooperate locally will dif-
fer. We distinguish among ten different positions. 
In order to identify different channels of department externali-
ties, we consider a second set of variables, which are more related
to the research characteristics of the department. First, we evaluate
the role of ‘Department’s Field-Speciﬁc Characteristics’. Marshall
(1890) initially proposed the idea that the relative size of an indus-
try within the local economy can generate stronger local external-
ities for that industry, for instance, if it uses speciﬁc local public
goods, or speciﬁc inputs or labour types, which urban economics
describe as ‘localisation economies’. The same intuition can be de-
veloped for an academic research ﬁeld, for instance, because not
all ﬁelds within economics are internationalised to the same ex-
tent, or because they do not need the same research mix in terms
of research assistance, computing facilities, or access to data. Ben-
eﬁting from a publications measure at the ﬁeld level allows us to
test whether academics in departments specialised in a particular
ﬁeld publish more in that ﬁeld. 
Since many ﬁelds are absent from many departments, we con-
sider a non-linear speciﬁcation for localisation effects, using two
variables. First, we consider a dummy variable (‘ Dep. ﬁeld pres-
ence’ ) that takes the value 1 if at least one academic in the de-
partment other than the one considered has published once in the
ﬁeld. Second, we use a specialisation variable (‘ Dep. specialisation’ )
- the share of department d ’s output in ﬁeld f at date t (other than
the academic’s output) - to assess the role of the ﬁeld’s relative10 As Ciccone and Peri (2006) emphasise, only a combination of the externality 
and of some possibly negative substitution effects is identiﬁed. 
n  
v  
c  
t  ize in the department. Importantly, because the academic’s ﬁeld
hoice in a given year may not be an accurate reﬂection of the
verage ﬁeld of specialisation, we compute the individual variables
hat rely on ﬁeld over a longer time span than the one used for the
ependent variable. All publications until τ are taken into account,
ut the more recent ones count more than the older ones (see
ppendix A for details). Then, the department-ﬁeld level explana-
ory variables are based on publication output at the ﬁeld level for
ll academics aﬃliated to the department at date t . 
Jacobs (1969) popularised the idea that the overall diversity of
he local activity can be beneﬁcial for local productivity, especially
n research-intensive sectors. According to this viewpoint, diver-
ity encourages the cross-fertilisation of ideas between industries,
hich strengthens innovation and growth. There is a large liter-
ture which tests this idea by introducing a diversity index into
he estimated speciﬁcations. This, typically, is a Herﬁndahl index
n the shares of each industry in the local economy. We adopt a
imilar procedure using the shares of each Jel code in the depart-
ent’s publications to obtain the department’s overall ﬁeld diver-
ity (‘ Diversity ’). 
Beyond department size, the physical proximity to other de-
artments with which academics might either interact or compete,
an matter. We capture this effect using an external research ac-
ess variable (‘ Research access ’), which is the spatially-discounted
um of the sizes of all other departments. It provides informa-
ion on whether externalities emerge between different, but proxi-
ate departments, as highlighted by urban economics over the last
wenty years for the case of market activities. 
Whether or not hiring top academics is a good strategy and
eneﬁts the other academics in the department is a debated ques-
ion. We test, more generally, whether the department’s hetero-
eneity in terms of its academics’ publication records, measured by
he within-department coeﬃcient of variation of individual output,
as an impact on individual publication output (‘ Heterogeneity ’). 
Departments also may differ in terms of the academics’ pat-
erns of co-authorship. Having academics connected to foreign aca-
emic institutions can generate positive externalities via network
ffects, for instance, an aspect that has been emphasised in the
ase of both market activities and research (see Ductor et al., 2014 ,
or a recent example in economics). We compute the share of the
epartment’s academics connected to (at least one) co-author lo-
ated outside of France, but not in the USA (‘ Non-USA connections ’),
nd the share of the department’s academics connected to co-
uthors located in the USA (‘ USA connections ’). 
We next describe the individual variables. It is crucial to con-
rol for individual characteristics in order not to attribute a simple
orting of different academics in different departments to an exter-
ality effect. The data set we use allows us to identify both the im-
act of individual characteristics and, therefore, to control for the
ossible non-random selection of academics across departments,
nd the externality impact of those characteristics, simultaneously.
or instance, older academics might publish less individually, but
xert a positive externality on the other academics in the depart-
ent. Therefore, we consider the role, at the individual level, of all
he variables for which a possible department level externality is
ested. This includes academics’ age (and its square), gender, posi-
ion held and rank A status, and dummy variables for connection
o at least one co-author abroad, but not in the USA, and connec-
ion to a co-author in the USA. 
We also include variables that reﬂect an academic’s individ-
al research characteristics. To test for the presence of economies
f scale within co-author teams, we introduce academics’ average
umber of authors per publication (‘ Authors per publication ’). This
ariable is central in many studies of the determinants of publi-
ation records that ignore the role of location, but evaluate the re-
urns from co-authorship, following Sauer (1988) . We also consider
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11 The effects of women and age are not displayed in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) 
since it is not possible to identify them separately from individual and year ﬁxed 
effects. There are some variations for the rank A and position variables within in- 
dividuals, but, since they are rare, we prefer also to remove these variables when 
considering individual ﬁxed effects. The results are hardly affected if they are in- 
cluded. 
12 The R 2 is lower for the probability to publish, but we do not have a benchmark 
value for this case, and it obviously arises, at least in part, from the large number 
of zero observations. 
13 Imagine a model with only two explanatory variables, y i = αx i + βz i + ε i . The 
ﬁrst row in the table would report in column ‘Std. dev.’ the variance of y i , to be 
explained. The second row in Column ‘Std. dev.’ would report the variance of α x i , 
i.e., of the effect of x i on y i , all else being equal. The ‘Corr.’ column would report 
the correlation between y i and again α x i . Considering the effect of x i , α x i , and not 
x i only, takes account of whether the impact of x i is large, with everything else 
controlled for or not (assuming that α is deterministic). This provides a way to as- 
sess the relative explanatory power of the variable. This can be applied nicely to a 
group of variables. For instance, the variance of αx i + βz i and then its correlation 
with y i would be reported. See Abowd et al. (1999) for more details on this type of 
variance analysis. The last column, ‘Sorting’, reports the correlation between the ef- 
fect of a variable or group of variables, with all department effects included (hence, cademics’ ﬁeld diversity (‘ Individual diversity ’), to assess whether
cademics beneﬁt from knowledge acquired in other ﬁelds, to pub-
ish in a given ﬁeld. This tests the presence of complementarities
etween ﬁelds at the individual level. The variable is the logarithm
f the number of ﬁelds in which the academic has published. 
Finally, some estimations also consider individual ﬁxed effects,
hich capture the role of any individual characteristic that is con-
tant over time. The deﬁnitions of all the variables are provided in
ppendix A . 
.4. Samples and mobility 
Using a three-year moving average for publication output pre-
ents us from considering years 20 06, 20 07 and 20 08. Therefore,
he time observations in our data set, span 1990 to 2005. Both the
umber of academics and the number of departments are mono-
onically increasing over time, from 1753 academics and 69 depart-
ents in 1990, to 2914 academics and 81 departments in 2005.
ver the 16 years of our panel, this leads to 39,266 academic-year
bservations and 1267 department-year observations, 1208 with at
east one academic who publishes. 
The regressions are performed at the ﬁeld level. Since there are
8 possible ﬁelds, the 39,266 academic-year observations trans-
ate into 706,788 academic-ﬁeld-year observations, which then is
ncreased because some observations are duplicated in the case
f academics with multiple aﬃliations. As a result, the number
f academic-ﬁeld-year observations in our ﬁrst-step estimation for
he probability to publish is 770,202. This reduces to 758,790
hen department-year ﬁxed effects are considered because some
epartment-years have no one that publishes. This reduces fur-
her to 424,044 when we include individual ﬁxed effects because
ome academics have no publications. Finally, because academics
o not publish in all ﬁelds, many of these observations correspond
o zero outcomes in a given ﬁeld. There are ‘only’ 38,836 non-zero
cademic-ﬁeld-year observations, which are the observations used
or the ﬁrst-step quantity and quality estimations for which we
ake logs. In the second step, we have 1208 department-year ob-
ervations. 
Appendix Table B.1 presents some descriptive statistics for in-
ividuals and departments. Overall, there is substantial variation
n the data in relation to individual publication output and de-
artment characteristics. As emphasised in the introduction, iden-
iﬁcation relies on the mobility of some academics between de-
artments, and on the fact that some have multiple department
ﬃliation at the same date. On average, each year, 2.1% of aca-
emics move to another department, and 14.8% have moved at
east once over the whole period. 9.0% of the individual-year ob-
ervations correspond to multi-aﬃliated academics, and 18.6% of
he academics have been multi-aﬃliated at least once. Mobility
ates between cities in comparable estimations of agglomeration
ffects in market activities, in general, also are around 2% per year.
here would appear to be room for mobility to be suﬃciently high
o allow for the identiﬁcation of both individual and department-
ime ﬁxed effects. However, what matters is the number observa-
ions relative to the number of ﬁxed effects to be identiﬁed, which
s higher when matched employer-employee wage or productivity
ata are used. Overall, these ﬁgures, on their own, make it diﬃcult
o assess whether or not our estimations are correctly identiﬁed.
e return to this issue in the discussion of the results. 
. Productive academics: Individual abilities versus department 
ffects 
This section studies the determinants of individual productiv-
ty and assesses the relative weights of individual and departmentffects. We regress individual productivity in a speciﬁc ﬁeld on in-
ividual characteristics related to both individual abilities and in-
ividual research features (including ﬁeld-time ﬁxed effects), de-
artment ﬁeld-speciﬁc variables (ﬁeld presence and specialisation)
nd department-time ﬁxed effects. Table 1 Columns (1) and (2)
‘Publishing’) refer to a linear probability model where the depen-
ent variable is 1 if academic i produces in ﬁeld f at date t and 0
therwise. Columns (3) and (4) (‘Quantity’) concern the log of the
umber of publications, and Columns (5) and (6) (‘Quality’) and
olumns (7) and (8) (‘Top quality’) regard the log of the average
ublication quality using the standard and top journal quality in-
exes respectively. For each output measure, the ﬁrst column ex-
ludes individual ﬁxed effects, which are included in second col-
mn. 11 
Before turning to the effect of each variable, we start with some
ariance analysis. A ﬁrst remark regards the large increase in the
 
2 , of 17% for the probability to publish, of 22% for the number
f publications, of 32% for publication quality and of 28% for top
uality when department effects are considered, compared to the
stimations (not reported here) that do not include department
haracteristics in the speciﬁcation (and when individual ﬁxed ef-
ects are not included in either case). The explanatory power of
he model increases even more if individual ﬁxed effects are in-
roduced. It becomes 50% to 80% higher compared to if only indi-
idual variables and department effects are included, and reaches
evels that are comparable although slightly lower, than those ob-
ained for the standard individual wage or productivity equations,
ith R 2 between 0.54 for quantity and 0.72 for top quality. 12 A
ast conclusion is that the model explains the average quality bet-
er than the number of publications and, especially, if we consider
he index for top quality. This would seem to make sense from an
cademic perspective, since publication in a top journal requires
ore speciﬁc skills, which are captured by the model, than just
ublishing in general. 
Obtaining more precise insights into the sources of output vari-
tion requires a more detailed variance analysis. It is provided
n Table 2 for the determinants of individual publication quality,
ithout (left panel) and with (right panel) individual ﬁxed effects.
irst, the ‘Std. dev.’ columns report the standard deviation of the
ffect of a variable or a group of variables for the quality estima-
ions presented in Table 1 columns (5) and (6) respectively. The
igher this standard deviation relative to the standard deviation
f the dependent variable to be explained (reported in the ﬁrst
ine), the larger the explanatory power of this variable or group
f variables. However, a variable or group of variables has a large
xplanatory power if its effect is largely correlated with the depen-
ent variable. This is reported in the ‘Corr.’ columns. 13 
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Table 1 
Determinants of individual publications. 
Publishing Quantity Quality Top quality 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Individual characteristics 
Women −0.016 a −0.119 a −0.067 a −0.270 a 
(0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.024) 
Age −0.005 a −0.035 a −0.022 a −0.093 a 
(0.0 0 0) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) 
Age square 0.0 0 0 a −0.0 0 0 a 0.0 0 0 a −0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 b −0.0 0 0 a 0.0 0 0 a −0.001 a 
(0.0 0 0) (0.0 0 0) (0.0 0 0) (0.0 0 0) (0.0 0 0) (0.0 0 0) (0.0 0 0) (0.0 0 0) 
Rank A 0.044 a 0.218 a 0.136 a 0.542 a 
(0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.024) 
Authors per publication −0.948 a −0.925 a 0.186 a 0.192 a 0.508 a 0.539 a 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.027) (0.034) 
Individual diversity −0.096 a −0.130 a 0.013 c 0.003 0.109 a 0.024 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.018) (0.020) 
Non-USA connection 0.376 a 0.193 a 0.307 a 0.084 a 1.128 a 0.342 a 
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.029) (0.031) 
USA connection 0.408 a 0.223 a 0.509 a 0.209 a 1.604 a 0.611 a 
(0.015) (0.019) (0.014) (0.016) (0.038) (0.042) 
Dep.-ﬁeld characteristics 
Dep. ﬁeld presence 0.063 a 0.122 a 0.345 a 0.334 a 0.114 a 0.087 a 0.359 a 0.318 a 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.055) (0.048) 
Dep. specialisation 0.014 a 0.024 a 0.098 a 0.088 a 0.036 a 0.020 a 0.132 a 0.084 a 
(0.0 0 0) (0.0 0 0) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) 
Fixed effects 
Field-time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Department-time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Position Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Individual No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R 2 0.07 0.13 0.33 0.54 0.37 0.65 0.46 0.72 
Observations 758,790 424,044 38,836 38,836 38,836 38,836 38,836 38,836 
Notes: Standard error between brackets. a , b , c : signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. OLS estimates. Variables 
are deﬁned in Section 2.2 . 
Table 2 
Variance analysis of the individual publication quality. 
Without individual ﬁxed effects With individual ﬁxed effects 
Std. dev. Corr. Sorting Std. dev. Corr. Sorting 
Explained: Quality 0.453 1.0 0 0 0.453 1.0 0 0 
Individual effects 0.159 0.452 0.193 0.340 0.753 −0.078 
Indiv. ﬁxed effect - - - 0.331 0.636 −0.097 
Obs. indiv. effects 0.159 0.452 0.193 0.178 0.254 0.031 
Women 0.015 0.048 0.017 - - - 
Age 0.082 0.132 −0.026 0.162 0.134 0.016 
Position 0.046 0.151 0.060 - - - 
Rank A 0.038 0.102 0.136 - - - 
Authors per pub. 0.040 0.215 0.092 0.041 0.215 0.038 
Individual diversity 0.004 0.141 0.120 0.001 0.141 0.032 
Non-USA connection 0.061 0.276 0.123 0.017 0.276 0.008 
USA connection 0.075 0.317 0.175 0.031 0.317 0.039 
Department effects 0.154 0.434 1.0 0 0 0.111 0.189 1.0 0 0 
Dep.-time ﬁxed eff. 0.152 0.418 0.988 0.110 0.173 0.992 
Dep.-ﬁeld-time eff. 0.024 0.134 0.169 0.014 0.142 0.133 
Field presence 0.016 0.066 0.116 0.012 0.066 0.033 
Specialisation 0.027 0.081 0.082 0.015 0.081 0.099 
Field-time ﬁxed effect 0.091 0.302 0.121 0.063 0.257 0.024 
Residuals 0.360 0.795 0 0.268 0.593 0 
Notes: The table presents the variance analysis of the estimations reported in Table 1 columns (5) 
and (6). First, all variables are centred with respect to their annual mean. Therefore, all the vari- 
ables are detrended and the variance analysis is performed along the within-time dimension. The 
“Individual effects” row corresponds to the simultaneous roles of individual observed and ﬁxed 
effects if any. The “Obs. indiv. effects” row corresponds to the role of all the observed individ- 
ual effects taken together. “Department effects” corresponds to the role of both department-time 
ﬁxed effect and all department-ﬁeld-time effects. “Dep.-ﬁeld-time eff.” reports the simultaneous 
roles of “Field presence” and “Specialisation’. See footnote 13 for details of what is reported in 
each column. 
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r  The variance analyses, considering or not individual ﬁxed ef-
ects, respectively the right- and left-hand sides of the table, differ
reatly. Without individual ﬁxed effects, the explanatory power of
ndividual and department effects is very similar in terms of both
he standard deviation of the effects (each around one-third of the
tandard deviation of the dependent variable) and the correlation
o the dependent variable (slightly less than 0.5). The two groups
f variables contribute to the same extent to explaining individual
ublication output. 
In contrast, individual effects have much larger explanatory
ower if individual ﬁxed effects are considered. The right-hand
ide of Table 2 shows that the standard deviation of individual
ffects is two-thirds that of the dependent variable, and is three
imes bigger than the one of department effects. The correlation
o the dependent variable is four times larger for individual ef-
ects. This means that some unobserved individual effects are sig-
iﬁcantly inﬂuencing publications quality and, if individual ﬁxed
ffects are not included in the speciﬁcation, part of this is captured
y the department-time ﬁxed effects. Appendix Tables C.1 , C.2 and
.3 reproduce the variance analysis respectively for the probability
o publish, publication quantity and top quality. For all the vari-
bles, the conclusions are similar. 
To sum up and keeping in mind that, if there is insuﬃcient
obility between departments – which we discuss further below,
ndividual ﬁxed effects cannot always be properly identiﬁed sepa-
ately from department effects, the lower bound of the explanatory
ower of department effects is around a quarter of the explanatory
ower of individual effects. However, at the upper bound, without
ndividual ﬁxed effects, but still including a fairly large set of indi-
idual observable characteristics, department effects can explain as
uch as individual effects. This contrasts with the ﬁndings in the
iterature. Waldinger (2012) ﬁnds no peer effects among physicists,
hemists and mathematicians in Nazi Germany. Similarly, Dubois
t al. (2014) ﬁnd no effects for modern-day mathematicians. Kim
t al. (2009) ﬁnd that the effect of being in the top 25 economics
nd ﬁnance departments gradually disappears between the 1970s
nd the 1990s in the USA. Note that these authors comment on
he fact that department effects are or are not signiﬁcant, but do
ot, as we do in this paper, discuss their overall explanatory power.
hus, the perspective is different and, in our view, our approach
s relevant for assessing the share of individual productivity ex-
lained by local effects. Another possible explanation of the differ-
nce between these results is that individual or department ﬁxed
ffects are not always properly identiﬁed. Unfortunately, whether
obility is suﬃciently high to identify both individual and depart-
ent ﬁxed effects is diﬃcult to test formally and is not attempted
n any of the literature. Finally, it might be that research habits
iffer between a European country, such as France, and the USA,
n terms of both research technology (e.g. intensity of internet use
or collaborations) and institutional design. For instance, the pos-
ibility of academics to capture their publication performance is
onsidered lower for most European countries where wages and
ositions are less closely tied to publication records (see Combes
t al., 2008b , for France). All of these factors might be affecting
he relative roles of individual and department effects. 
Another important result emphasised by Combes et al. (2008a )
s related to the sorting of workers across space. More able work-
rs locate in more favourable locations, that is, those where the lo-
ation effects reﬂecting local externalities are strongest. The “Sort-
ng” columns in Table 2 for publication quality, and in Tables C.1,
.2 and C.3 for the probability to publish and the quantity and top
uality of publications, report the correlation between the effecthe value 1.0 0 0 for the line ‘Department effects’). This allows us to assess which 
ariable (or group of variables) is the most strongly correlated to the department 
omponent of individual productivity. 
e
(
i
sf a variable or group of variables and the overall department ef-
ects. Typically, it is positive for observed individual characteris-
ics. Workers with individual observed characteristics that promote
igher numbers of publications and higher quality, are located in
epartments that provide larger external effects. 14 When individ-
al ﬁxed effects are not controlled for, the correlation of all indi-
idual observed effects together with overall department effects,
s large at 0.19. However, it falls to 0.03 when individual ﬁxed ef-
ects are controlled for and we observe a negative correlation at
0.10 between individual ﬁxed effects and overall department ef-
ects. Therefore, we ﬁnd that the effect of spatial sorting of aca-
emics is quite large and positive on the observed characteristics,
ut that it decreases hugely if individual ﬁxed effects are consid-
red; the overall sorting turns negative (at −0.08) due to a more
han compensating negative sorting on unobservable characteris-
ics. 
The sorting results for quality lie between those obtained for
uantity and top quality, which are reported in Appendix C . In re-
ation to quantity, there is almost no sorting on observed charac-
eristics (correlation at +0.01 and −0.04 without and with ﬁxed
ffects respectively) and a fairly large negative sorting for indi-
idual ﬁxed effects (correlation at −0.16). For top quality, there
s a positive sorting effect on observed characteristics (+0.24 and
0.04 without and with ﬁxed effects respectively), thus, stronger
han for quality, and a fairly small negative sorting for individual
xed effects ( −0.04). Unfortunately, none of the papers assessing
he magnitude of peer effects in science computes these corre-
ations between individual and department effects, which would
ave allowed us to compare these important results with those
rom other ﬁelds or for other periods. 
The presence of a negative sorting on unobserved academic
haracteristics would be a striking result. However, we cannot ex-
lude that a negative sorting on unobserved individual character-
stics is the result of weak separate identiﬁcation of individual
nd department ﬁxed effects. Further investigation renders this hy-
othesis more credible. We re-estimate the model after removing
he departments and academics contributing, a priori, the most to
dentiﬁcation, that is, ﬁrst, the three largest departments, which
ccount for around 15% of French academics, and second, the 15%
ost productive academics. In both cases, the negative correlation
etween individual ﬁxed effects and department effects increases
o −0.19 in the ﬁrst case and to −0.41 in the second case, for in-
tance, for the quantity of publications (see full results in Bosquet
nd Combes, 2017 ). As Andrews et al. (2012) emphasise, this is a
ign of possible lack of identiﬁcation power. 
. Role of individual characteristics 
Before investigating in Section 5 the channels for local effects,
e discuss the role of individual characteristics. The results in
able 1 suggest that women and older academics publish less. This
s consistent with the ﬁndings in the literature and this is even
ore intuitive in our case since we control for type of position
eld. Once a given position is achieved, full professor for instance,
he number and quality of publications decrease with age. Part of
he effect might result also from a cohort effect (previous genera-
ions had less incentives to publish than younger academics). 
As described in Bosquet and Combes (2017) , the results for
he impact of different positions are as expected. The higher the
ank (professor, research professor and, especially, INSEE or Ponts-14 Age is negatively correlated to department ﬁxed effects and has a negative 
ffect on output, so, again, we ﬁnd that academics with “good” characteristics 
younger age), tend to locate in better quality departments. The women dummy 
s the only exception here, although the correlation to the dependent variable is 
mall. 
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o  et-Chaussées engineers, compared to assistant professor or junior
research fellow) and the more time allocated to research (research
versus teaching positions), the higher the quantity and quality of
publications. This applies also to academics in pure economics de-
partments compared to those who work also in business or math-
ematics, for instance. Therefore, even if part of the promotion
process in France does not depend on publications, as shown in
Combes et al. (2008b ), those who are appointed to more senior
positions tend to publish more on average. Note that our aim here
is not to give a causal interpretation for these variables, but to con-
trol for individual ability when estimating the role of departments.
Note, also, that we control not only for some of the standard
“ability” variables considered in wage and productivity equations
but also for variables characterising the academic’s research. The
variables showing the largest correlation to the dependent vari-
able are the connection variables. Academic economists with more
co-authors working abroad (both in the USA and elsewhere), also
publish more and are generally over-represented in better depart-
ments. Again, the direction of the causalities cannot be determined
here. 
The average number of co-authors per publication also has
a large explanatory power. Its impact on published quantity is
mostly negative. Having more co-authors decreases the number of
published papers, which means that attributing only part of the
publication to each co-author corresponds to a stronger effect than
the effect of producing more papers with more co-authors. In other
words, the quantity published is subject to decreasing returns to
scale in terms of the number of authors; academics would pub-
lish more papers were they to work alone. However, the average
number of co-authors has a large positive effect on average publi-
cation quality, and this is almost three times larger for top quality.
Therefore, a larger number of co-authors decreases the equivalent
number of publications written alone, but increases their quality.
Thus, there is a trade-off, which only an analysis such as that pre-
sented here can identify. For instance, according to the estimates
controlling for individual ﬁxed effects (although magnitudes are
very similar without), an academic with an average of two co-
authors rather than one (per publication) has 31.3% fewer publi-
cations, but their average quality is 8.1% higher and average top
quality is 24.4% higher. 15 Combining these two effects, having two
co-authors rather than one, decreases the quality-adjusted number
of publications (a measure that is frequent in the literature and
here is obtained by multiplying the quantity by the average qual-
ity) for both standard and top quality, although less in the case of
top quality. Therefore, we should not expect a higher number of
publications, even in good quality journals, based on co-authoring,
but we can expect a higher possibility of publication in top jour-
nals. The article by Sauer (1988) , which is one of the earliest con-
tributions on the impact of co-authorship on publication, ﬁnds al-
most no effect, and two other studies, also on economists, Hollis
(20 01) and Medoff (20 03) , conclude that there is a negative effect
of co-authorship on publication quality. Dubois et al. (2014) iden-
tify an overall negative effect of co-authorship among mathemati-
cians on their citations-adjusted publication index, but the effect of
collaboration with co-authors with different specialisation is pos-
itive. Ductor (2015) ﬁnds for economists a negative effect of co-
authorship between 1970 and 2011, which turns positive if unob-
served heterogeneity and endogenous co-authorship formation are
accounted for. Overall, our results are more in line with studies
that ﬁnd a negative impact of co-authorship; however, ours is the
only work that estimates the effect of co-authorship on the aver-
age quality of publication. We ﬁnd that this is positive, the more
the more selective the journal. 15 1 . 5 −0 . 925 − 1 , 1 . 5 0 . 192 − 1 and 1 . 5 0 . 539 − 1 , respectively. 
p  We ﬁnd also that a higher diversity of research ﬁelds decreases
he number of an academic’s publications, but has no impact on
heir quality and, possibly, has a positive impact on top-quality
ublications, although this disappears if we control for individual
xed effects. Dubois et al. (2014) ﬁnd a positive effect of ﬁeld di-
ersity for mathematicians. 
Finally, in Bosquet and Combes (2017) we report estimations for
he quality determinants that control for individual quantity, al-
hough endogeneity concerns might be more severe than for other
ariables. This allows us to test for the presence of increasing re-
urns to scale on quality at the individual level (as opposed to the
o-author team level, assessed before based on the number of co-
uthors). This has been overlooked in most previous work. We ﬁnd
ncreasing returns to number of publications for average quality
nd, even more so, for top quality. The more academics publish,
he higher the average quality of their publications. An academic
ith twice as many publications has an average publication qual-
ty 6.6% higher, and a top publication quality 40.8% higher when
ot controlling for individual ﬁxed effects. 16 It follows, also, that
he impact of the number of co-authors per publication on quality
s even stronger if controlling for quantity. 
Notice that all these results hold within ﬁeld since we control
or Jel code ﬁxed effects. Jel codes appear to have quite large ex-
lanatory power, especially in relation to publication quality and
op quality. This reﬂects the fact that not all ﬁelds are equal in
erms of publication opportunities. To the best of our knowledge,
o one has attempted to assess whether this is due to a purely
fashion” effect (some topics are more “fashionable”, which makes
ublication easier) or to some selection effects (more able aca-
emics self-select in certain ﬁelds or particular ﬁelds attract more
ble academics). We do not aim in this paper to tackle this diﬃcult
uestion. However, in terms of interpretation, here, individual and
epartment effects are estimated net of the direct role of publica-
ion ﬁelds. 
. Channels of department externalities 
Recall, that we want not only to emphasise that local effects
re present in academia, which is in line with the literature and
iscussed in Section 3, but also to assess whether the standard lo-
al characteristics considered in urban economics, completed by a
umber of others potentially relevant for academic research activ-
ty, matter. This requires us to study both the impact of the ﬁeld
resence and specialisation variables in the ﬁrst-step estimation,
nd the determinants of the department ﬁxed effects in the sec-
nd step. The results are presented in Table 3 . The ﬁrst two rows
eport the results of the ﬁrst-step estimations ( Table 1 ); subse-
uent rows report the estimations of speciﬁcation (2) on the panel
f department-time ﬁxed effects. 
As shown by the low within-time R 2 values reported in
he penultimate row of Table 3 , we can conclude that, broadly,
epartment-time ﬁxed effects are diﬃcult to explain when con-
rolling for individual ﬁxed effects. Even when not controlling for
ndividual ﬁxed effects, the explanatory power of overall depart-
ent characteristics is lower than usually obtained for the case
f market activities. As reported in Table 2 for quality and in
ppendix C for the other publication measures, the two ﬁeld-
peciﬁc department characteristics, introduced in the ﬁrst-step
peciﬁcation, also have much lower explanatory power than the
epartment-time ﬁxed effects. Generally, the explanatory power of
epartment characteristics is slightly higher at the two extremes
f the publication measures as shown by the full variance analysis
rovided in Table 4 , which does not account for individual ﬁxed ef-16 2 0 . 092 − 1 and 2 0 . 494 − 1 respectively. 
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Table 3 
The effects of department characteristics. 
Publishing Quantity Quality Top quality 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Field presence (from 1st step) 0.063 a 0.122 a 0.345 a 0.334 a 0.114 a 0.087 a 0.359 a 0.318 a 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.055) (0.048) 
Specialisation (from 1st step) 0.014 a 0.024 a 0.098 a 0.088 a 0.036 a 0.020 a 0.132 a 0.084 a 
(0.0 0 0) (0.0 0 0) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) 
Size 0 . 003 
a −0 . 002 0.009 0.0 0 0 0 . 034 a −0 . 013 0.055 −0 . 033
(0.001) (0.002) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.035) (0.035) 
% women 0.009 0.008 −0 . 041 0.157 −0 . 002 0.068 0.011 −0 . 110
(0.007) (0.014) (0.083) (0.120) (0.097) (0.109) (0.264) (0.276) 
Average age 0 . 001 
a 
0 . 002 
a −0 . 002 0.002 −0 . 006 c −0 . 005 −0 . 026 a −0 . 025 a 
(0.0 0 0) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) 
% rank A −0 . 013 b −0 . 037 a 0.101 −0 . 149 0 . 286 a −0 . 022 1 . 061 a −0 . 150
(0.005) (0.011) (0.067) (0.097) (0.079) (0.089) (0.214) (0.225) 
Diversity 0.001 −0 . 011 a −0 . 073 a −0 . 059 b 0 . 043 c −0 . 027 0.054 −0 . 043
(0.002) (0.003) (0.020) (0.027) (0.023) (0.024) (0.064) (0.062) 
Research access 0 . 001 
b −0 . 003 b 0 . 025 a −0 . 012 0 . 036 a 0.001 0 . 122 a 0.033 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.022) (0.024) 
Heterogeneity −0 . 022 a −0 . 021 a 0.0 0 0 −0 . 014 0 . 098 a 0.025 0 . 382 a 0 . 141 c 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.026) (0.034) (0.031) (0.032) (0.084) (0.079) 
USA connections 0 . 139 
a 
0 . 094 
a −0 . 270 0.048 1 . 052 a 0.251 3 . 080 a 0.700 
(0.017) (0.025) (0.181) (0.219) (0.220) (0.205) (0.597) (0.515) 
Non-USA connections 0 . 162 
a 
0.031 0 . 267 
c 
0.192 0 . 302 
c −0 . 289 c 1 . 324 a −0 . 549
(0.013) (0.020) (0.144) (0.177) (0.175) (0.166) (0.474) (0.416) 
Positions’ shares Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time ﬁxed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE in 1st step No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R 2 0.62 0.72 0.69 0.58 0.56 0.49 0.56 0.62 
OLS within-time R 2 0.47 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.22 0.04 0.28 0.06 
Observations 1208 1208 1208 1208 1208 1208 1208 1208 
Notes: Feasible General Least Squares. Standard error between brackets. a , b , c : signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Table 4 
Variance analysis of the determinants of department ﬁxed effects. 
Probability Quantity Quality Top Quality 
Std. dev. Corr. Std. dev. Corr. Std. dev. Corr. Std. dev. Corr. 
Explained: Dep. ﬁxed eff. 0.027 1 .0 0 0 0.285 1 .0 0 0 0.350 1 .0 0 0 0.979 1 .0 0 0 
Observed characteristics 0.019 0 .686 0.082 0 .288 0.166 0 .474 0.514 0 .525 
Composition effects 0.011 0 .065 0.059 0 .205 0.104 0 .366 0.278 0 .396 
Gender 0.001 −0 .032 0.001 0 .011 0.012 0 .084 0.039 0 .089 
Age 0.003 −0 .090 0.003 −0 .030 0.011 −0 .019 0.059 −0 .011 
Rank A 0.002 −0 .222 0.023 0 .167 0.042 0 .342 0.180 0 .393 
Positions 0.009 0 .145 0.050 0 .164 0.082 0 .280 0.164 0 .222 
Research characteristics 0.021 0 .587 0.057 0 .200 0.108 0 .375 0.354 0 .450 
Size 0.003 0 .043 0.002 0 .011 0.020 −0 .008 0.025 −0 .003 
Research access 0.002 0 .210 0.038 0 .168 0.055 0 .288 0.185 0 .333 
Diversity 0.001 0 .138 0.039 0 .109 0.011 0 .016 0.015 −0 .004 
USA connections 0.008 0 .463 0.019 −0 .099 0.058 0 .333 0.181 0 .392 
Non-USA connections 0.010 0 .486 0.021 0 .132 0.027 0 .313 0.105 0 .366 
Heterogeneity 0.009 0 .341 0.001 −0 .001 0.032 −0 .108 0.127 −0 .089 
Residuals 0.020 0 .728 0.273 0 .958 0.308 0 .881 0.833 0 .851 
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17 e 0 . 334 − 1 , e 0 . 318 − 1 , e 0 . 122 − 1 , and e 0 . 087 − 1 , respectively. ects. Department characteristics matter more for either just pub-
ishing or at the other extreme of the distribution, publishing in a
igh quality journal, and are less important for number of publica-
ions. 
The only department characteristics that exert a signiﬁcant pos-
tive impact on individual publications, both with and without
ndividual ﬁxed effects, and for all publication dimensions, are
he two ﬁeld-speciﬁc characteristics. The marginal effects of ﬁeld-
peciﬁc characteristics are quite large. For instance, the presence
f an academic’s ﬁeld in the department increases the number of
ther academics’ publications in that ﬁeld, and their average top
uality by almost 40% (39.7% and 37.4% respectively). The effect is
ower for the probability to publish and average standard quality13.0% and 9.1%). 17 Similarly, the elasticity of specialisation, which
or market activities is in the range 0.01-0.05 for productivity, is
igniﬁcantly larger here for quantity and top quality. Doubling the
epartment’s share of publications in a ﬁeld (corresponding to an
ncrease of one standard deviation at the median), increases in-
ividual quantity and average top quality by 6.3% and 6.0% re-
pectively. 18 From the regressions reported in Bosquet and Combes
2017) , we see that controlling for individual quantity in the ﬁrst
tep estimation, positive ﬁeld presence and specialisation impact
re due not just to the fact that these characteristics increase indi-18 2 0 . 088 − 1 and 2 0 . 084 − 1 . 
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l  vidual quantity, which, in turn, increases average quality as shown
in Section 4 . The impact of the department-ﬁeld variables remains
signiﬁcant when controlling for individual quantity, and lower by
only around one third. Overall, more academics in the department
in a given ﬁeld helps other academics to publish more and to pro-
duce publications of higher quality, in that ﬁeld. The so-called lo-
calisation effects that reﬂect local economies of scale within the
ﬁeld, similar to their effect within industries in market activities,
impact signiﬁcantly publications in economics in France. 
The impact of size of the local economy on local productivity
has been the focus of many urban economics papers. We could
have evaluated the role of the size of the city where the univer-
sity is located. However, we believe that local externalities may
be even more localised in relation to academic activities, for in-
stance, because these activities require more face-to-face contact.
Therefore, we use department size, deﬁned as the number of full-
time equivalent academics. This is an interesting variable for policy
since it is, at least partly, down to the department head, the uni-
versity or central government (in many European countries). We
test the relevance of our choice of spatial scale in two ways. First,
we include in the speciﬁcation a research access variable for prox-
imity to other departments, which allows us to separate very local
size externalities from more diffuse ones. Second, we provide es-
timates at the employment area level, a more aggregated spatial
classiﬁcation. 
Department size, similar to overall department characteristics,
has no signiﬁcant impact on department ﬁxed effects when con-
trolling for individual ﬁxed effects. Without individual ﬁxed effects,
the positive elasticity obtained for quality is of the same magni-
tude as the estimates in the literature for market activities. Dou-
bling department size would increase average quality by 3%-4%.
The fact that the effect disappears when individual ﬁxed effects are
introduced might mean that academics with better characteristics
join larger departments. 
The ﬁndings for the “Research access” variable seem to indi-
cate a further role of local size at a larger spatial scale, through
proximity to nearby departments. When not controlling for indi-
vidual ﬁxed effects, the elasticity of research access is positively
signiﬁcant for all dimensions of publication productivity. It is fairly
high for top quality, since multiplying research access by 5, which
is around one standard deviation at the median, increases aver-
age top quality by 21.7%. The impact is still 6.0% for quality and
4.1% for quantity. 19 Again, this may be the result of the sorting of
more eﬃcient academics according to unobserved characteristics,
in departments with better research access since the effects are no
longer signiﬁcant when individual ﬁxed effects are controlled for.
The explanatory power is also much higher for market access than
for size, with a still quite low standard deviation of the effects, but
a rather large correlation to the dependent variable (0.33 for top
quality from Table 4 for instance). 
More in line with the analyses in urban economics, we can as-
sess the role of size on a larger spatial scale by aggregating the
data at city level. We use employment areas, which refer to 341
spatial units in France built by INSEE, the French national insti-
tute of statistics, speciﬁcally to study the role of local labour mar-
kets. For many employment areas, there are either no universities
or only one (for 38 employment areas): thus, considering depart-
ment or employment area is the same. Six employment areas host
two departments, four employment areas host three departments,
and three employment areas host four or more departments. The
results in Bosquet and Combes (2017) are very similar at this scale
compared to university departments. In particular, the elasticity of
local size, which should be the most affected by this change of spa-19 5 0 . 122 − 1 , 5 0 . 036 − 1 and 5 0 . 025 − 1 , respectively. 
e  
w  
a  ial scale, is generally only slightly smaller and less signiﬁcant. Re-
earch access still matters, and its impact on top quality remains
igniﬁcant when individual ﬁxed effects are controlled for, with a
igh value at 0.099. Overall, it is diﬃcult to assess whether local
ffects matter more at the department or at the city level, possi-
ly because these two levels are too similar. However, moving to
 larger spatial scale, that is, the region, would reduce the number
f observations too much and would make less sense in terms of
onnections between departments. 
In addition to size and market access, some other department
ariables have signiﬁcant explanatory power when not control-
ing for individual ﬁxed effects. This contrasts with the ﬁndings in
uch of the urban economics literature, which show that these
wo variables mostly explain productivity differences across loca-
ions. We study the role of co-authors’ locations based on the con-
ection variables. The literature on academic networks (see for in-
tance Laband and Tollison, 20 0 0; Rosenblat and Mobius, 2004 )
hows that distance to co-authors has increased signiﬁcantly over
ime. If the links to co-authors were not controlled for, access to
epartments outside France could have been computed and we
ight have found a positive effect. Here, having co-authors abroad,
ither in the USA or elsewhere, increases both the individual quan-
ity and quality of publications, as shown in Section 3 . Also, these
wo variables are among those that have the largest explanatory
ower of department ﬁxed effects. The elasticities are large even
hough, again, they reduce and lose signiﬁcance when individual
xed effects are controlled for. The role of USA connections is
he strongest for the extreme dimensions of publication, that is,
he probability to publish, and the average top quality, while non-
SA connections affect all dimensions of publication activity (prob-
bility to publish, number of publications and publication qual-
ty). In this case, the effect increases moving across these dimen-
ions (when individual ﬁxed effects are not controlled for). In a
orld where distance matters much less than previously, being
onnected to other academics elsewhere and, in particular, to col-
eagues in the USA, remains important. This is in line with the
ajor role of networks in academia that is underlined in the lit-
rature. 
Having heterogeneous academics in a department enhances av-
rage publications quality and, especially top quality, with an effect
hat remains slightly signiﬁcantly positive at 10% even when con-
rolling for individual ﬁxed effects. We are not aware of a similar
nding in the literature. The presence of top people in the depart-
ent may help others publishing in the best journals. The explana-
ory power of this variable is also quite large. By contrast, hetero-
eneity has no effect on publications quantity and has a small neg-
tive effect on the probability to publish. Field diversity in the de-
artment has a rather small impact in general, most often negative,
ut, in any case, quite sensitive to the speciﬁcation chosen. Indus-
ry diversity for market activities is also often found to have a not
ery robust impact. 
Finally, we consider as department characteristics the shares
n the department of the various individual characteristics con-
idered in the ﬁrst step. Taken together, they have similar ex-
lanatory power to department overall research characteristics (re-
pectively rows ‘Composition effect’ and ‘Research characteristics’
n Table 4 ). However, it is the department composition in terms
f positions that matters most. Recall that when individual posi-
ion is controlled for in the ﬁrst-step, a larger share of higher/the
ost productive positions tend, in general, to increase the publica-
ion output of all other academics in the department. Bosquet and
ombes (2017) ﬁnd that this is especially true when not control-
ing for individual ﬁxed effects, and a few effects remain signiﬁcant
ven when individual ﬁxed effects are controlled for. The share of
omen, and average age explain much less. Older academics, in
 given position in the department, exert a signiﬁcant effect even
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m  hen controlling for individual ﬁxed effects. The effect is positive,
ut negligible for the probability to publish, and slightly larger and
egative for top quality. Increasing department’s average age by
hree years (which is close to one standard deviation at the me-
ian), for a given composition of positions, decreases top quality
y 7.2%. 20 The share of women in the department has no impact
n publication output, neither positive nor negative. 
. Conclusions 
Location matters for the publication performance of French
conomists and economics departments. A careful variance analy-
is of individual publication determinants shows that the explana-
ory power of department effects accounts for at least a quarter
f the explanatory power of individual effects. This corresponds to
hat many academics would expect. However, it contrasts sharply
ith previous ﬁndings of the literature, which show the pres-
nce of small or no local effects. We attribute this difference to
ur exhaustive data covering all academic economists in France
ith many individual variables, which allow us (i) to follow them
ver time and across locations even if they do not publish, (ii) to
onsider more local effects and (iii) to develop a more complete
conometric strategy. Moreover, we separately studied the deter-
inants of the probability to publish, the number of publications
nd their average quality, whereas most studies in the literature
onsider only the quality-adjusted number of publications. 
A new and puzzling result emerges, which future research
hould investigate: neither standard variables considered in urban
conomics nor a number of departments’ research characteristics
xplain overall local effects. Nevertheless, department ﬁeld special-
sation, which measures localisation economies at the ﬁeld level
as a robust and rather large positive impact on the department
cademics’ publications in that ﬁeld. We ﬁnd some evidence that
cademic mobility in France might be too low to properly identify
ndividual and department-time ﬁxed effects simultaneously. This
uggests that our strategy should be replicated with other coun-
ries to conﬁrm or reject these ﬁndings and to propose some fur-
her variables that might explain the roles of both department and
ndividual unobserved characteristics. It is possible that teaching
oad and student quality or the eﬃciency of the local adminis-
ration, which cannot be controlled for here, are important. Also,
ore subtle effects, such as the atmosphere in the department,
hich sometimes is mentioned by academics, might also have an
ffect. 
Due to possible missing variables and reverse causality when
stimating the agglomeration effects, we do not claim to provide
 conclusive assessment of the role of department effects on in-
ividual performance. We would argue that endogenous individ-
al location choices are of little concern, at least in the French
ontext, while historical natural experiments lack external validity.
ssues arising from the endogeneity of department characteristics
ight be more serious and should be treated. The possibility of
ombining bibliometric and administrative sources, as in the cur-
ent paper, should be extended to cover longer periods, other ﬁelds
nd other countries. This would allow researchers to identify even
ore sources of exogenous variation in order to properly assess
he role of endogenous and exogenous individual and department
haracteristics. Adding more structure to the underlying network
ormation and agglomeration and peer effects models, which here
re only implicit and, therefore, treated as a black box, would help
o improve the estimated speciﬁcations. Ultimately, this and future
ork should provide important results to contribute to the better
esign of higher education and research policies. 20 e −3 ×0 . 025 − 1 . ppendix A. Deﬁnition of variables 
1. Publication measures 
Academics’ publication output at date t is given by the sum of
he value of all their publications over period τ ( τ corresponds
o years t + 1 , t + 2 , and t + 3 in our implementation). To assess
he value of a publication, each publication a is ﬁrst weighted by
he quality of the journal, W ( a ), in which it is published. We use
he Combes and Linnemer (2010) journal weighting scheme. Each
ournal weight is a weighted average of various recursive impact
actors built from Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge impact fac-
ors 21 and from Google Scholar citations. 22 For journals not listed
n the Web of Knowledge, Combes and Linnemer (2010) use an
conometric model to infer their weight. This leads to a ranking
f all EconLit journals. Unfortunately, the ranking is constant over
ime and all of a journal’s publications receive the same weight
ndependent of their publication year. Then a function is applied
o the ranking to obtain more or less selective weighting schemes.
ere, we compare the determinants of publications using two of
hem, CLm in which selectivity is moderate (ranging from a weight
f 100 for the Quarterly Journal of Economics through 55.1 for the
ournal of Labor Economics , for instance, to a weight of 4 for the
owest ranked journal) and CLh which is more selective (ranging
rom 100 for the Quarterly Journal of Economics to 0.0 0 07 for the
owest ranked journal, via 16.7 for the Journal of Labor Economics ).
e refer to these two schemes as the ‘Quality’ and ‘Top quality’
ublication measures, respectively. 
Publication a is also weighted by the inverse of its number of
uthors, n ( a ). Since a department’s publications output is the sum
f the publication outputs of its academics, we do not want a pub-
ication written by two members of the department to account for
ore (or less) than the same publication written by a single au-
hor. As mentioned above, we evaluate the presence of increasing
r decreasing returns to scale within co-author teams, using the
verage number of authors per publication as one of the indepen-
ent individual variables. 
The output measure also takes account of the number of pages
n the article, p ( a ), relative to the average length of all articles
n EconLit in the same journal in the same year, p . This captures
he idea that longer articles should contain more ideas and inno-
ations. A natural example is provided by the difference between
hort and regular papers in the American Economic Review . Impor-
antly, these means are computed within each journal-year. This
ssumes that the editorial policy of the journal is consistent within
 year, an article 20% shorter than the journal average represent-
ng 20% less output, for instance. Conversely, differences in article
ength between journals, which can stem from different page and
ont sizes or from real contribution differences, are assumed to be
irectly and fully reﬂected in the journals’ quality weight, W ( a ). In
ome sense, our choice is intermediate between fully ignoring pub-
ication length, and using the absolute number of pages as some-
imes done in the literature. 
Finally, publication output is measured at the ﬁeld level to en-
ble us to study the effect of ﬁeld-speciﬁc characteristics and to
ontrol for between-ﬁeld differences at the French level. We use
el codes at the ﬁrst digit level (letter) and we ignore the ﬁelds
Y - Miscellaneous Categories” and “Z - Other Special Topics”. We
lso slightly modify the codes C and D by merging codes C7 (Game
heory and Bargaining Theory) and C9 (Design of Experiments)
ith Microeconomics (code D) and removing them from Mathe-
atical and Quantitative Methods (code C), which we believe is21 http://www.webofknowledge.com/ . 
22 http://scholar.google.com/ . 
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a  more coherent. This leaves us with 18 ﬁelds. The weight of publica-
tion a attributed to academic i is ﬁrst divided by the publication’s
number of Jel codes, J ( a ), and then multiplied by the publication’s
number of Jel codes corresponding to ﬁeld f, J f ( a ). 
To sum up, the publication output of academic i at date t in
ﬁeld f is given by: 
y i f t = 
1 
Card (τ ) 
∑ 
a ∈ (i,τ ) 
W (a ) 
n (a ) 
p(a ) 
p 
J f (a ) 
J(a ) 
, 
where Card( τ ) is the number of years in period τ , typically
Card (τ ) = 3 for τ = t + 1 , t + 2 , t + 3 . 
Then, y ift is decomposed as follows: 
y i f t ≡ 1 ( Quantity i f t > 0) × Quantity i f t ×
y i f t 
Quantity i f t 
, 
where Quantity ift is the number of publications of academic i in
ﬁeld f at date t , Quantity i f t = 1 Card (τ ) 
∑ 
a ∈ (i,τ ) 
J f (a ) 
n (a ) J(a ) 
. The ﬁrst com-
ponent is a dummy variable equal to 1 when at least one of aca-
demic i ’s publications at date t refers to Jel code f . The second
component measures the publication quantity of active academic
i in ﬁeld f at date t . The last component corresponds to the aver-
age quality of publications of active academics i in ﬁeld f at date t .
The observation weighting in estimations uses the share of ﬁeld f
in academic i ’s output at date t , S i f t = 
Quantity i f t 
Quantity it 
, multiplied by αidt ,
the share of academic i ’s output attributed to department d at date
t deﬁned below. 
A2. Department characteristics 
Let y ift denote the publication yearly output of academic i in
ﬁeld f at date t . The total yearly output of academic i at date t is
the sum of y ift over all ﬁelds, y it = 
∑ 
f y i f t . Since some academics
split their time between multiple departments, let αidt denote the
share of academic i ’s output attributed to department d at date t .
90% of our academics have only one aﬃliation, in which case αidt 
is equal to 1 for one department only and to 0 for all others. Then
an equal splitting between all aﬃliations is assumed, and αidt is 1
over the total number of aﬃliations. Department d ’s yearly output
in ﬁeld f at date t is given by Y df t = 
∑ 
i ∈ dt αidt y i f t and its total
output by Y dt = 
∑ 
f Y df t = 
∑ 
i ∈ dt αidt y it . 
The time span used here to measure activity at date t consists
of the moving average of the publications over the three years that
follow t . Importantly, because academics’ ﬁeld choice in a given
year may not perfectly reﬂect their average ﬁeld of specialisation,
we compute individual variables that depend on ﬁeld over a longer
time span. In this case, as suggested by Combes and Linnemer
(2010) , we discount, over time, past publications in the ﬁeld: all
publications until τ are taken into account, but more recent ones
count more than older ones. The discount factor t ′ years before t
corresponds to a logistic function given by 
1 −exp ( −10 / (t ′ +1) 1 . 8 ) 
1+ exp ( −20 / (t ′ +1) 1 . 2 ) . Year
t publications count 1, year t − 1 publications count 0.94, year t − 2
publications count 0.75, and so on. For instance, after 10 years they
count 0.20, and after 20 years 0.10 only. 
The ﬁrst ‘Department’s Field-Speciﬁc Characteristic’ consists of
a dummy variable for the presence of the ﬁeld in the department: 
Field Presence df t = 1 if ˜ Y df t − ˜ yi f t > 0 , 
= 0 else , 
where ˜ Y df t and ˜ yi f t are the same publication measures as those
used to measure academics’ output, but calculated over a differ-
ent time span, which considers all publications, but discounts them
over time. 
Note that, strictly speaking, this variable and some described
subsequently, depend on each individual and not just the depart-
ment. However, they capture the notion of external effects and werefer to keep these notations for the sake of clarity. For market
ctivities, it is less crucial to exclude the own individual values
rom the computation of local variables since, in any case, many
re negligible and the measure is almost not affected. Here, an in-
ividual can, on his or her own, represent a large share of the de-
artment’s output in a ﬁeld, and this makes interpretation cleaner.
Then a specialisation variable - the share of department d ’s out-
ut in ﬁeld f at date t (other than the academic’s output) - is given
y: 
pecialisation df t = log 
˜ Y df t − ˜ yi f t 
˜ Y dt − ˜ yit 
. 
The diversity index net of the size effect is given by: 
iversity dt = log 
[ ∑ 
f 
(
˜ Y df t 
˜ Y dt 
)2 ] −1 
− log 
[ ∑ 
f 
(
Y˘ df t 
Y˘ dt 
)2 ] −1 
, 
here 
∑ 
f 
(
Y˘ df t 
Y˘ dt 
)2 
is a randomly-generated Herﬁndahl index built
y simulations. Indeed, a problem arises because, by construction,
he crude Herﬁndhal diversity index is highly correlated to de-
artment size. This is because departments with small numbers of
cademics have many Jel codes without any publications. To re-
ove this size effect, which is absent in standard urban economics
tudies because there are few locations without any activity in an
ndustry, we subtract from the gross diversity index the value it
ould take if all academics in the department were to randomly
hoose their Jel codes. We ﬁrst attribute random Jel codes to each
ublication, assuming that the probability to publish in each Jel
ode follows a binomial law with a probability of success given
y the share of output in each Jel code at the French level. Then,
he department diversity index is recomputed using these new Jel
odes. The randomly-generated Herﬁndahl index for the depart-
ent is the average of 10 0 0 such procedures. 
The research access variable is the spatially-discounted sum of
he sizes of all other departments: 
esearch Access dt = log 
∑ 
d ′  = d 
Size d ′ t 
Dist d d ′ 
, 
here Dist d d ′ is the geographical distance between departments d
nd d ′ . Alternative speciﬁcations of the research access variable,
ith squared distance or the square root of distance in the denom-
nator, were tested and led to qualitatively similar results. We keep
he most standard one. 
The department’s heterogeneity in terms of academics’ publica-
ion records is measured by the within-department coeﬃcient of
ariation of individual output: 
eterogeneity dt = log 
Standard Deviation ( ˜  yit ) i ∈ (d,t) 
Average ( ˜  yit ) i ∈ (d,t) 
, 
here Standard Deviation ( ˜  yit ) i ∈ (d,t) and Average ( ˜  yit ) i ∈ (d,t) are the
tandard deviation and the average of individual publication out-
uts within department d at date t . 
Finally, ﬁeld diversity at the individual level is given by: 
ndividual Diversity it = log 
[ ∑ 
f 
1 ( ˜  yi f t > 0) 
] 
, 
here 1 ( ˜  yi f t > 0) is a dummy variable equal to 1 when academic
 has at least once published in ﬁeld f until date t . 
ppendix B. Descriptive statistics and simple correlations 
Panel (a) in Table B.1 presents descriptive statistics for all
cademics. The average academic is 45.6 years old and 25% are
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r  omen. We do not present the share of each of the 10 positions
istinguished, but we create two aggregate variables that char-
cterise them. The line ‘Teaching’ reports that 83% of academic-
ear observations have statutory teaching loads, others correspond
o researcher academics. The line ‘Rank A’ reports that 35% of
cademic-year observations correspond to a rank A position, that
s, equivalent to full professor as opposed to assistant professor. 
Not all academics publish over a given three-year period. The
Publisher’ row in Table B.1 panel (a) reports that one-third have
ublished at least one article over the three-year period, possi-
ly co-authored, and in any ﬁeld. This is one of the ﬁgures that
hanged quite substantially over time, rising from 0.17 in 1990 to
.42 in 2005. Panel (b) in Table B.1 provides descriptive statistics
or the sub-group of academics who published at least one article
ver the three years. They are almost three years younger, slightly
ess likely to be women, and more likely to hold non-teaching and
ank A positions. Table B1 
Descriptive statistics. 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Panel (a): All academics 
Age 45.6 9.1 
Women 0.25 0.41 
Rank A 0.35 0.45 
Teaching 0.83 0.36 
Publisher 0.33 0.45 
Quantity 0.17 0.36 
Quality 4.3 10.2 
Top quality 0.80 5.31 
Panel (b): Publishers 
Age 42.7 9.1 
Women 0.22 0.38 
Rank A 0.49 0.47 
Teaching 0.75 0.40 
Quantity 0.52 0.46 
Quality 13.3 14.3 
Top quality 2.44 8.92 
Authors per publication 1.9 0.7 
Non-USA connection 0.1 0.3 
USA connection 0.07 0.24 
Individual diversity 2.6 1.6 
Panel (c): Departments 
Size 31.6 34.6 
Age 45.0 3.5 
Women 0.24 0.12 
Rank A 0.34 0.19 
Teaching 0.79 0.34 
Publishers 0.34 0.20 
Quantity 5.47 8.21 
Quantity per academic 0.18 0.18 
Quality 11.82 8.16 
Top quality 1.94 4.48 
Field presence 0.60 0.27 
Specialisation 0.27 0.18 
Diversity −0.54 0.46 
Research access 49.7 63.5 
Non-USA connection 0.04 0.07 
USA connection 0.02 0.06 
Heterogeneity 2.3 0.9 
Notes: Variables are deﬁned in Section 2.2 . To mat
publication variables are ﬁrst computed as thre
statistics are computed. The number of observat
12,924, and 1208 respectively. Descriptive statist
calculated on the sub-sample of departments in w
and, hence, for which all variables are deﬁned. S
is ﬁrst averaged by department (weighted by th
output), then the statistics are computed. The row ‘Quantity’ in Table B.1 panel (a) reveals that the av-
rage academic publishes 0.17 papers equivalent alone per year,
hich is one paper with one co-author every three years. This
s small, but due partly to the fact that many academics do not
ublish any papers. Conditional on having at least one publication
ver the three-year period, Table B.1 panel (b) shows that the av-
rage number of publications is three times higher, corresponding
o, for instance, one single authored publication and one publica-
ion with a co-author, every three years. In relation to quality, we
an conﬁrm the well documented large disparities existing among
cademics (see Lotka, 1926 ). The mean publication is worth the
quivalent of one publication per year in the 150th ranked journal,
ut the median publication is lower, at around the 350th ranked
ournal. By contrast, the top decile average quality publication cor-
esponds to one publication per year in the 50th ranked journal or1st decile Median Last decile 
32 46 58 
0 0 1 
0 0 1 
0 1 1 
0 0 1 
0 0 0.57 
0 0 12.1 
0 0 0.22 
31 41 56 
0 0 1 
0 0 1 
0 1 1 
0.17 0.33 1.06 
4.0 7.9 29.4 
0.01 0.04 4.94 
1 2 3 
0 0 1.0 
0 0 0 
1 2 5 
7.5 18.0 82.0 
40.6 45.0 49.3 
0.10 0.24 0.39 
0.13 0.31 0.64 
0 0.97 1 
0.11 0.30 0.62 
0.44 2.76 12.64 
0.04 0.13 0.37 
5.67 9.19 20.85 
0.02 0.27 5.04 
0.21 0.61 0.94 
0.12 0.21 0.50 
−1.18 −0.46 −0.01 
6.0 17.0 154.4 
0 0.01 0.13 
0 0 0.07 
1.3 2.1 3.5 
ch what is done in the econometric section, 
e-year moving averages before descriptive 
ions for panels (a), (b) and (c) are 39,266, 
ics at the department level (panel (c)) are 
hich there is at least one published author 
pecialisation deﬁned at the Jel code level 
e share of the Jel code in the department 
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Table B2 
Simple correlations at the department level. 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Quantity (1) 0.92 0.73 0.06 −0.15 −0.19 0.52 −0.40 0.51 −0.26 0.23 0.26 0.52 0.48 −0.47 
Quality (2) 1 0.91 0.10 −0.16 −0.19 0.56 −0.46 0.54 −0.20 0.14 0.31 0.60 0.59 −0.32 
Top quality (3) 1 0.20 −0.12 −0.17 0.51 −0.40 0.56 −0.18 0.04 0.31 0.54 0.54 −0.09 
Size (4) 1 0.18 −0.05 0.06 0.15 0.71 −0.44 0 −0.11 0.01 −0.05 0.38 
Age (5) 1 −0.18 0.28 0.02 0.01 0 −0.08 0.19 −0.23 −0.15 0.27 
Women (6) 1 −0.27 0.14 −0.14 0.09 −0.08 0.13 −0.18 −0.12 0.07 
Rank A (7) 1 −0.58 0.29 −0.07 −0.01 0.43 0.41 0.44 −0.27 
Teaching (8) 1 −0.07 −0.09 0.05 −0.42 −0.40 −0.47 0.36 
Field presence (9) 1 −0.58 0.30 0.07 0.30 0.26 0.06 
Specialisation (10) 1 −0.78 0.06 −0.05 −0.01 0.06 
Diversity (11) 1 −0.04 0.04 0.01 −0.31 
Research access (12) 1 0.26 0.31 −0.14 
Non-USA connection (13) 1 0.61 −0.26 
USA connection (14) 1 −0.22 
Heterogeneity (15) 1 
Notes: Variables are deﬁned in Section 2.2 . Specialisation deﬁned at the Jel code level is ﬁrst averaged by department (weighted by the share of the Jel code in 
the department output) and all variables are detrended before statistics are computed. 
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pone publication in one of the top 5 journals every three years. The
average quality of publications of academics in France appears to
be better in terms of the top quality index, since the mean is now
around the 50th journal, the median around the 100th, and the top
decile around the 30th journal. 10% of publishing academics have
at least one co-author abroad, but not in the USA, and 7% have at
least one co-author in the USA. The average number of authors per
paper is 1.9 and, more precisely, 44.7%, 38.0% and 14.8% of the pub-
lications have one, two, and three authors respectively. Only 2.5%
of the publications have strictly more than three authors. 
The row ‘Individual Diversity’ in Table B.1 panel (b) reveals that
the average number of ﬁelds per publishing academic over a three-
year period is 2.6 and the very diversiﬁed academic at the top
decile publishes in 5 ﬁelds. At the national level, ‘Microeconomics’
is the most represented ﬁeld in France with 16.8% of publications.
This is larger than its share in EconLit as a whole, which is 10.2%.
Then, there are 10 ﬁelds each representing more than 4%. 23 
Panel (c) in Table B.1 reports the descriptive statistics at depart-
ment level. The average department has 31.6 academics who are 45
years old on average, 24% are women, 34% have rank A positions,
and 34% publish. The ﬁgures are comparable to the averages for
all academics. Importantly, all the variables present quite a lot of
variation between departments, in particular, for publication out-
put. The average department has 5.5 publications per year, 0.18 per
academic, and the average quality indexes are in the same ranges
as for individual academics. The row ‘Field presence’ reveals that
cumulative publications in the average department cover 60% of
Jel codes at the ﬁrst digit level (letter). Specialisation of the me-
dian department means that a Jel code present in the department
represents 21% of the department’s cumulative output. Thus, de-23 ‘Industrial organization’ (9.5% vs 8.8% for EconLit as a whole), ‘Develop- 
ment/Growth’ (8.8 vs 10.0%), ‘Finance’ (8.8 vs 10.9%), ‘Macro/Monetary economics’ 
(8.2 vs 7.2%), ‘Labour/Demography’ (8.2 vs 8.3%), ‘International economics’ (7.6 vs 
7.8%), ‘Agricultural/Environmental economics’ (5.6 vs 7.0%), ‘Economics history’, 
‘Thoughts and methodology’ (5.4 vs 2.2%), ‘Public economics’ (4.2 vs 4.3%), ‘Ur- 
ban and regional economics’ (4.2 vs 5.0%). artments are fairly specialised, given that there are 18 different
ossible Jel codes. In the very specialised department at the top
ecile of specialisation, each Jel code represents half of the pub-
ications. This is conﬁrmed by the diversity index, which almost
lways takes negative values even at the top decile, meaning that
epartments are less diversiﬁed than they would be with random
el code choices. 
Finally, Table B.2 presents simple correlations between the vari-
bles at the department level. First, quantity and quality are mostly
ositively correlated even for the top quality index. Those depart-
ents that publish more also produce higher quality publications
nd there seems to be no trade-off between the two. This is in
ine with Combes and Linnemer (2003) ﬁndings at the European
evel. Academics are also, on average, more productive in depart-
ents where the share of rank A is higher and the share of teach-
ng positions lower, and where ﬁeld diversity and research access
re high. Correlations are also positive, but lower for share of aca-
emics with co-authors abroad, and in the USA (connection vari-
bles), and, again, large for heterogeneity, which is positively and
egatively correlated to quantity and quality respectively. The cor-
elation of size to quantity is not very strong, but increases for
uality and even more so for top quality. The challenge is to inves-
igate whether these correlations are driven by the fact that rank A
osition researchers or researchers with higher abilities more gen-
rally, are over-represented in some departments through selection
ffects and/or by the fact that some academics or department char-
cteristics generate more externalities. 
ppendix C. Variance analyses of individual probability to 
ublish, publication quantity and top quality 
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Table C1 
Variance analysis of the individual probability to publish. 
Without individual ﬁxed effects With individual ﬁxed effects 
Std. dev. Corr. Sorting Std. dev. Corr. Sorting 
Explained: Publishing 0.203 1.0 0 0 0.266 1.0 0 0 
Individual effects 0.033 0.170 0.056 0.073 0.259 −0.096 
Indiv. ﬁxed effect - - - 0.089 0.191 −0.071 
Obs. indiv. effects 0.033 0.170 0.056 0.061 0.031 −0.012 
Women 0.007 0.030 −0.012 - - - 
Age 0.024 0.079 0.008 0.061 0.031 −0.012 
Position 0.018 0.105 0.045 - - - 
Rank A 0.020 0.085 0.048 - - - 
Department effects 0.028 0.181 1.0 0 0 0.041 0.185 1.0 0 0 
Dep.-time ﬁxed eff. 0.022 0.119 0.754 0.026 0.053 0.590 
Dep.-ﬁeld-time eff. 0.018 0.133 0.625 0.034 0.188 0.779 
Field presence 0.024 0.072 0.372 0.044 0.094 0.325 
Specialisation 0.025 0.028 0.100 0.042 0.050 0.274 
Field-time ﬁxed effect 0.020 0.145 0.338 0.034 0.196 0.437 
Residuals 0.197 0.966 0 0.249 0.935 0 
Notes: Same notes as for Table 2 . 
Table C2 
Variance analysis of the individual publication quantity. 
Without individual ﬁxed effects With individual ﬁxed effects 
Std. dev. Corr. Sorting Std. dev. Corr. Sorting 
Explained: Quantity 0.457 1.0 0 0 0.457 1.0 0 0 
Individual effects 0.214 0.471 0.007 0.324 0.654 -0.156 
Indiv. ﬁxed effect - - - 0.261 0.502 −0.163 
Obs. indiv. effects 0.214 0.471 0.007 0.197 0.410 −0.039 
Women 0.027 0.093 0.019 - - - 
Age 0.066 0.028 0.035 0.034 0.012 0.062 
Position 0.029 0.090 0.022 - - - 
Rank A 0.061 0.085 0.075 - - - 
Authors per pub. 0.204 0.353 −0.077 0.199 0.353 −0.066 
Individual diversity 0.031 0.046 0.008 0.042 0.046 0.018 
Non-USA connection 0.074 0.110 0.064 0.038 0.110 0.032 
USA connection 0.060 0.117 0.068 0.033 0.117 0.042 
Department effects 0.123 0.274 1.0 0 0 0.134 0.169 1.0 0 0 
Dep.-time ﬁxed eff. 0.104 0.234 0.841 0.120 0.117 0.891 
Dep.-ﬁeld-time eff. 0.067 0.141 0.529 0.061 0.141 0.434 
Field presence 0.048 0.033 0.186 0.047 0.033 0.151 
Specialisation 0.074 0.105 0.357 0.066 0.105 0.291 
Field-time ﬁxed effect 0.071 0.158 0.012 0.078 0.102 −0.075 
Residuals 0.377 0.825 0 0.313 0.685 0 
Notes: Same notes as for Table 2 . 
Table C3 
Variance analysis of the individual publication top quality. 
Without individual ﬁxed effects With individual ﬁxed effects 
Std. dev. Corr. Sorting Std. dev. Corr. Sorting 
Explained: Top quality 1.305 1.0 0 0 1.305 1.0 0 0 
Individual effects 0.528 0.527 0.238 1.028 0.807 −0.018 
Indiv. ﬁxed effect - - - 1.050 0.622 −0.043 
Obs. indiv. effects 0.528 0.527 0.238 0.686 0.258 0.039 
Women 0.062 0.069 0.017 - - - 
Age 0.270 0.141 −0.015 0.647 0.144 0.029 
Position 0.126 0.180 0.108 - - - 
Rank A 0.152 0.141 0.150 - - - 
Authors per pub. 0.109 0.236 0.103 0.116 0.236 0.025 
Individual diversity 0.035 0.179 0.125 0.008 0.179 0.017 
Non-USA connection 0.223 0.334 0.138 0.068 0.334 0.019 
USA connection 0.236 0.360 0.193 0.090 0.360 0.044 
Department effects 0.468 0.489 1.0 0 0 0.285 0.209 1.0 0 0 
Dep.-time ﬁxed eff. 0.459 0.468 0.982 0.280 0.178 0.979 
Dep.-ﬁeld-time eff. 0.087 0.155 0.187 0.058 0.164 0.185 
Field presence 0.050 0.068 0.102 0.044 0.068 0.011 
Specialisation 0.099 0.103 0.114 0.063 0.103 0.161 
Field-time ﬁxed effect 0.265 0.337 0.168 0.159 0.281 0.038 
Residuals 0.962 0.737 0 0.695 0.533 0 
Notes: Same notes as for Table 2 . 
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Supplementary material associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at 10.1016/j.jue.2017.05.003 . 
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